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Potash: Unequal Protection

UNEQUAL PROTECTION: EXAMINING THE JUDICIARY’S
TREATMENT OF UNWED FATHERS
Brett Potash*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States has heard a handful of
cases dealing with constitutional questions relating to unmarried
fathers and their rights concerning their children. 1 Historically, unwed
fathers have received overall negative treatment from courts around
the country compared to their female counterparts. 2 For example, until
the 1970s, mothers (whether married or not) have always been able to
consent to an adoption whereas unwed fathers could not. 3 The
differing treatment between mothers (married or not) and unwed
fathers stems “from the difficulty of determining the identity of the
natural father, compared with the ease of identifying the mother.” 4
This perception of “difficulty” affected the way courts have

*B.A. in History, State University of New York College at Buffalo; J.D. 2018, Touro College
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. I would like to give special thanks to my two Note Editors,
Jessica Vogele and Rhona Amorado. Their patience, support, feedback, and encouragement
were crucial throughout the entire writing process. This Note would not be what it is without
either of them. I would also like to thank Dean Myra Berman for her many discussions with
me and suggestions about how I can make this the best Note possible. Her expertise in this
particular area of the law was highly valued and utilized throughout the entire Note. I would
also like to thank my loving family and friends who provided me unlimited support and
motivation throughout my law school career. Their understanding of the sacrifices I willingly
took in order to simultaneously write this Note, while succeeding in law school, will forever
be appreciated.
1 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
2 See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Family Issue(s), 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 325 (1994).
3 Id. at 330.
4 Id.
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determined many notable cases, and in turn, have shaped the modern
definition of a “family” as we know it today. 5
Traditionally speaking, the term “family” is typified by the
nuclear, or “marital family” (i.e., married parents and their children). 6
Modernly speaking, there are practically an infinite number of
combinations of people living together that can constitute a family. 7
Changes in patterns and forms of a “traditional” family have been the
subject of intense public debate, and at the forefront of that debate is
not only what constitutes a family but also to what individual
constitutional rights parents may be entitled. 8 The constitutional right
to parent should be associated with the individual as opposed to the
individual’s marital status because the definition of a “normal”
marriage or family is constantly evolving. 9
The judiciary’s often negative opinion on the rights of unwed
fathers can be attributed to the influence of societal gender
stereotyping. 10
Gender
stereotypes
are
defined
as
“overgeneralization(s) of characteristics, differences, and attributes of
a certain group based on their gender.” 11 Many typical gender
stereotypes remain prevalent in today’s film and television industry––
portraying women as “shy, passive, and submissive” and working
“clean jobs” such as teaching or secretarial work, while portraying men
as “tough, aggressive, dominant, and self-confident” and working
“dirty” jobs such as construction or mechanics. 12 These are broad
generalizations that are not true for every individual; nevertheless,
these stereotypes continue to exist despite evidence to the contrary. 13

5

See cases cited supra note 1.
See generally David D. Meyer, Self-Definition in the Constitution of Faith and Family, 86
MINN. L. REV. 791 (2002).
7 Id.
8 Id. at 792, 794.
9 This, as mentioned, is more of an issue for unwed fathers as it is for mothers. See generally
Blythe Wygonik, Refocus on the Family: Exploring the Complications of granting the Family
Immigration Benefit to Gay and Lesbian United States Citizens, 5 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 493
(2005).
10 Vicky C. Jackson, What Judges Can Learn From Gender Bias Task Force Studies,
(Sept.
21,
2017),
HEINONLINE
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/judica81&div=9&id=&page;
Patricia R. Recupero et al., Gender Bias and Judicial Decisions of Undue Influence in
Testamentary Challenges, JAAPL, (Sept. 21, 2017), http://jaapl.org/content/43/1/60.
11 NOBULLYING, https://nobullying.com/gender-stereotypes/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2017).
12 Id.
13 Id.
6
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Society expects individuals to behave in a manner consistent
with his or her gender-specific stereotype and may harshly criticize
those who do not. 14 Society expects women to get married young and
start having children as soon as practical. 15 Men, because they are not
the traditional homemakers or child-raising parents, are not normally
faced with this kind of gender stereotyping. 16
Society has a preconceived notion that women are superior to
men in raising children and make for better parents, and men,
generally, are incapable of caring for and raising children on their
own. 17 During a custody battle, the mother will become the
presumptive custodial parent, barring facts that suggest doing so would
not be in the best interest of the child. 18 Men, however, are as capable
of raising children as woman are, absent facts suggesting otherwise. 19
Presumptively awarding women child custody over men, absent facts
favoring this decision, may be grounds for an equal protection
violation. 20 When Courts deprive an unwed father of his rights,
possibly due to a Justice’s personal bias, that Justice is legislating
morality and abusing his or her power of judicial discretion; thereby
violating the unwed father’s equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 21
This Note argues that questions concerning the constitutional
rights of not only unwed biological fathers but also parents in general,
as it pertains to their children, should be subject to a strict scrutiny
analysis and not intermediate scrutiny, which is the current standard.
This Note will analyze and discuss the Court’s treatment of unwed
fathers in the Stanley-Michael H. line of cases. Each of these cases
discuss the rights, or in some cases the lack thereof, of unwed fathers. 22
While the Court has yet to outline a specific definition for the term
“parent,” this Note seeks to help form one.

14

Bonnie L. Roach, Gender Stereotyping: The Evolution of Legal Protections for Gender
Nonconformance, 12 ATLANTIC L.J. 125 (2010).
15 See generally id.
16 Id.
17 NOBULLYING, supra note 12.
18 See generally Bernardo Cuadra, Family Law- Maternal and Joint Custody Presumptions
for Unmarried Parents, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 599 (2010).
19 Id.
20 See discussion infra Part II.
21 See discussion infra Part I.
22 See cases cited supra note 1.
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This Note will be divided into five parts. Part II of this Note
will analyze the Equal Protection Clause under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, along with its history
and different levels of review. Part III will provide an overview of five
Supreme Court decisions in this area of law, commonly referred to as
the Stanley-Michael H. line of cases. 23 Part IV will analyze and discuss
the similarities of the Stanley-Michael H. line of cases and distinguish
these cases in terms of which favor the rights of unwed fathers and
which hinders these rights. Part V will suggest a solution to how the
courts should treat unwed fathers as well as discuss how the Supreme
Court, if ever presented the opportunity to define the term “parent,”
should do so by incorporating unwed fathers into that definition. Part
VI will provide an overall summary of this Note’s most central theme:
That the constitutional right to parent should be associated with the
individual as opposed to the individual’s marital status.
II.

THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides, “No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.” 24 The Supreme Court has stated,
“The purpose of the equal protection clause . . . is to secure every
person within the state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by
its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” 25 For almost
a century, however, the Court was consistently reluctant to use the
Equal Protection Clause to invalidate any state or local laws. 26 During

23

Because many of these cases have strong, persuasive dissents and do not have
overwhelming majorities, this is an area of the law that will likely continue to be disputed.
24 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Equal protection applies to the federal government through
judicial interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and to state and local
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 712 (4th ed. 2011). The Supreme Court,
however, has declared that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment is the same as
that under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
25 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co.
v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923), (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Twp. of
Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918))).
26 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 711 (4th ed.
2011).
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this time, the Court only decided race-related equal protection clause
claims, 27 as evident in the Slaughter-House Cases. 28
A.

History of the Equal Protection Clause

In the 1872 Slaughter-House Cases, Louisiana created a partial
monopoly concerning the slaughtering business by giving one
company the sole privilege of slaughtering animals. 29 Competing
slaughterhouses, inter alia, argued that this violated their “equal
protection of the laws.” 30 The Court struck down their equal protection
argument, opining that the claim was misplaced because the clause
itself was established to void laws “clearly intended to prevent the
hostile discrimination against the negro race.” 31
The Slaughter-House Cases represents an example that, prior
to the Warren Court Era, 32 the Court only applied the Equal Protection
Clause to racial and ethnic minorities. 33 In the mid-1950s, however,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes referred to the Equal Protection Clause
as “the last resort of constitutional arguments.” 34 Justice Holmes was
likely referring to the possibility that anyone may use the equal
protection clause to challenge almost any law as discriminating against
them. 35 He also was likely referring to the Court’s consistent
reluctance over the years to use the Equal Protection Clause to
invalidate state or local laws. 36 This reluctance, however, went awry
in an infamous 1954 case concerning segregation in public schools. 37
In the seminal case, Brown v. Board of Education, 38 the Court
relied on the Equal Protection Clause as a key tool to overturn

27

Id.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, (1872).
29 Id. at 48.
30 Id. at 66.
31 Id. at 38.
32 The Warren Court Era was between 1953-1959. See The Eisenhower Adiminstration,
BOUNDLESS US HISTORY, https://www.boundless.com/u-s-history/textbooks/boundless-u-shistory-textbook/politics-and-culture-of-abundance-1943-1960-28/the-eisenhoweradministration-216/the-warren-court-1460-8616/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2017).
33 See Roger V. Abbott, Is Economic Protectionism a Legitimate Governmental Interest
Under Rational Basis Review?, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 475, n.28 (2013).
34 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
35 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 26.
36 Id.
37 See generally Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38 Id.
28
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discriminatory laws and protect the citizens’ most fundamental
rights. 39 In Brown, the Court reviewed four state cases in which
African-American children sought admission into their local public
schools on a non-segregated basis. 40 In each case, the children were
denied admission to the schools attended by Caucasian children under
state laws requiring or permitting segregation based on race. 41 Since
African-American children were treated differently from Caucasian
children (in the educational setting) based solely on race, an Equal
Protection violation was obvious. 42
The Court in Brown struck down state-sponsored segregation,
the “separate but equal doctrine,” because of its stigmatizing effects 43
and because it denied some individuals educational opportunities.44
The Brown Court felt that relying on the Equal Protection Clause in
this instance was necessary because the separate but equal doctrine
impinged on the paramount role that education plays “to our
democratic society.” 45 This case ushered in a new era of Equal
Protection jurisprudence where the Equal Protection Clause would be
used to combat invidious discrimination and for protecting
fundamental rights. 46
B.

Equal Protection Clause Analysis

In analyzing all Equal Protection cases, the first step is to ask
whether a sufficient interest justifies the government’s classification.47
To help answer this question, there are three distinct levels of judicial
review—strict, intermediate, and rational basis—that the Supreme
Court uses for different classifications in order to evaluate the
constitutionality of a law, statute, or regulation. 48

39

Id. at 494.
Id. at 487-88
41 Id.
42 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 493.
46 Id.
47 Downtown Bar & Grill, LLC v. State, 273 P.3d 709, 711 (Kan. 2012).
48 See generally Melanie E. Meyers, Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection
Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1184 (1986).
40
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Strict Scrutiny

Strict scrutiny is “[s]trict in theory and fatal in fact” 49 because
the test is so difficult to overcome that a law under its review will
almost certainly be invalidated. 50 If a plaintiff can establish that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate test for the Court to apply to the
classification in question, the burden is on the state to show a
compelling government purpose and that the means of achieving that
compelling government purpose is narrowly tailored or there is no
other less restrictive alternative. 51
Examples of classifications subject to strict scrutiny include
race, alienage, national origin, religion, right to travel within the
country, right of privacy, freedom of speech, right to vote, and
infringements on fundamental rights, including the right to parent. 52
For racial classifications, the Court applies strict scrutiny to “smoke
out illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is
pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect
tool.” 53
Strict scrutiny was applied in the famous case of Loving v.
Virginia. 54 In Loving, an interracial couple married in violation of a
Virginia statute and were criminally convicted. 55 On appeal to the
Supreme Court, Virginia maintained that it had a compelling state
interest to preserve racial pursuit through the anti-miscegenation
statute. 56 The Court disagreed and struck down the statute, reasoning
that regulating marriage solely on the basis of race was arbitrary and
invidious. 57 The Court held that states might not prevent marriages
between people solely on the basis of race without violating the Equal
Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 58 Therefore, the

49 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
50 Id.
51 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005).
52 Meyers, supra note 48, at n.14.
53 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
54 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
55 The court agreed to set aside the verdict so long as the Lovings left Virginia and did not
return for twenty-five years. Id. at 3.
56 Id. at 8.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 12.
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statute did not pass the strict scrutiny test because there was no
compelling state interest. 59
2.

Intermediate Scrutiny

Under intermediate scrutiny, the state has the burden to show
that a law is substantially related to an important governmental
purpose. 60 As its name implies, intermediate scrutiny is a standard of
review that is less rigorous than strict scrutiny, but more rigorous than
rational basis. 61 Classifications that are subject to intermediate
scrutiny include discrimination against children born out of wedlock,
commercial speech, speech in public forums, and gender
discrimination. 62 The Supreme Court first applied intermediate
scrutiny in Craig v. Boren. 63
In Craig, the plaintiffs challenged a law which allowed women
aged eighteen and over to purchase low alcohol content beer, but did
not allow men to purchase any alcohol until they were twenty-one. 64
Oklahoma argued its important governmental purpose was to decrease
the rate of drunk driving among teenage males. 65 Statistical evidence
was presented in an attempt to show the government had an important
reason behind the enacted statute. 66 The Court, however, stated that
the statistical evidence was not substantially related enough to warrant
the conclusion that gender represents an accurate marker for the
regulation of drinking and driving. 67 The Court held that this evidence
was insufficient to support the gender-based discrimination that arose
from the statute. 68
The statute did not pass intermediate scrutiny because the
state’s method of achieving its objective (by banning men from
purchasing alcohol until age twenty-one and allowing women to
purchase low alcohol beer at age eighteen) was not substantially
related to its purpose (to decrease the rate of drunk driving among
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Loving, 388 U.S. at 1.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266.
See generally Meyers, supra note 48.
Id.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 201.
Id.
Craig, 429 U.S. at 201.
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teenage males). Therefore, the Court held that the gender-based
discriminatory Oklahoma law violated equal protection. 69
3.

Rational Basis

Under rational basis scrutiny, the plaintiff has the burden to
show that a law is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. 70 This standard of review applies to all state classifications
that do not affect a suspect or a quasi-suspect class and do not impinge
a fundamental right. 71 Examples of classifications that, if challenged,
would be subject to a mere rational basis review include, but are not
limited to, economic relations, age discrimination, wealth
discrimination, disability discrimination, and sexual orientation
discrimination. 72
Historically, most legislation reviewed under rational basis is
upheld because courts almost always defer to state governments for
non-suspect classifications. 73 The Supreme Court has held that, if a
court can imagine any conceivable way in which a law or action
furthers a legitimate purpose, a law subject to the rational basis test
will be upheld. 74 However, if a state’s interest in a particular piece of
legislation is animus—the prejudicial disposition toward a discernible,
constitutionally protected group of persons 75— then the interest is not
legitimate and the court will strike down the law. 76
In Romer v. Evans, 77 Colorado voters adopted “Amendment 2”
to their State Constitution prohibiting any judicial, legislative, or
executive action designed to protect persons from discrimination based
on their homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices

69

Id. at 190-91.
See, e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988); U.S. Railroad Retirement
Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 175, 177 (1980); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522,
527 (1959).
71 See generally Meyers, supra note 48.
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
74 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993).
75 Animus, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
76 See generally Meyers, supra note 48.
77 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985) Here, the court used rational basis to strike down a zoning ordinance that
required special use permits for group homes for the mentally retarded. Id. at 640. The
requirement appeared to rest solely on an irrational bias towards mentally retarded people. Id.
70
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or relationships. 78 Following a legal challenge by homosexual and
other aggrieved parties, the state trial court entered a permanent
injunction enjoining Amendment 2’s enforcement. 79 The Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. 80 The Supreme Court struck down
Amendment 2, and held that the Amendment violated the equal
protection clause because it singled out homosexuals and imposed on
them a “broad disability” by denying them the right to seek and receive
specific legal protection from discrimination. 81 Even though most
legislation reviewed under rational basis is upheld because of the
deference is given to state legislatures for non-suspect classes, the
Court held that the amendment was unexplainable “by anything but
animus toward the class it affects.” 82 As such, the Court invalidated
the amendment because animus is not a legitimate governmental
purpose. 83
To summarize, the Court uses strict scrutiny for “suspect”
classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage, 84
intermediate scrutiny for “quasi-suspect” classifications based on
gender and legitimacy, 85 and rational basis for classifications based on
age, wealth, disability, sexual orientation, and economic regulations. 86
The Court uses intermediate scrutiny for gender-based
classifications because, in its opinion, differences between men and
women may, in some circumstances, justify different treatment. 87
While recognizing that each case is fact specific and should be decided
as such, using intermediate scrutiny as the presumptive standard for
applying gender-based classifications is, in many of the following
cases, too lenient of an approach. 88 The parent-child relationship is
such an important and sacred relationship that when an unwed father’s
rights are literally on the line, he should be afforded the utmost

78

Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-634.
Id. at 625.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 620-621.
82 Id. at 632.
83 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
84 Suspect Classification, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
85 Id.
86 Meyers, supra note 48.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (discussing the
allowable bases for gender classifications).
88 See Norman T. Deutsch, Nguyen v. Ins and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to
Gender Classifications: Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185 (2003).
79
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protection, and strict scrutiny is the standard that provides the unwed
father with this utmost protection. 89
III.

UNWED BIOLOGICAL FATHERS AND THEIR RIGHT TO
PARENT: THE SUPREME COURT’S POSITION

The Supreme Court has long recognized that a biological
parent’s relationship with his or her child is a fundamental right that is
tied to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 90 The state should
only sever such a connection under limited circumstances. 91 Different
Supreme Court Justices, however, have differing opinions on this
issue. 92
According to Justice Stewart, one of these limited
circumstances occurs in his dissent in Caban v. Mohammed. 93 Justice
Stewart suggested that a biological father’s parental rights are secondrate compared to those of a biological mother:
Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the
biological connection between parent and child. They
require relationships more enduring . . . . The mother
carries and bears the child, and in this sense her parental
relationship is clear. The validity of the father’s
parental claims must be gauged by other measures. 94
In Justice Stewart’s view, the biological relationship between a
natural unwed father and his biological child presents the unwed father
with a chance to “accept . . . some measure of responsibility for the
child’s future” so that he can “enjoy the blessings of the parent-child
relationship.” 95
If an unwed biological father does not grasp that chance, then
Justice Stewart suggested, that person should not have a
constitutionally protected right. 96 Once an unwed father grasps the
parent-child relationship, however, the Court has recognized that “a
89 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 755, 753 (1982) (discussing “the fundamental liberty
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”).
90 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
91 Id.
92 See discussion infra Part III.
93 Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 397 (1979). (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94 Id.
95 Lehr, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
96 Id.
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father, no less than a mother, has a constitutionally protected right to
the companionship, care, custody, and management of the children he
has sired and raised.” 97
After more than three decades, Justice Scalia took an
alternative view in his dissenting opinion in Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl. 98 In this case, a baby girl was born to a Hispanic mother and
Cherokee Indian father. 99 The parents were not married at the time the
child was born, which occurred off the Cherokee reservation. 100
During pregnancy, the father voluntarily surrendered his parental
rights to the mother via text message. 101 When the baby was born, the
mother placed the child up for adoption. 102 The adoptive parents
notified the father of the pending adoption, who in turn did not consent
to the adoption, but sought custody of the child. 103
The Court determined that the Indian Child Welfare Act 104 does
not protect the rights of a parent who has never had custody of a
child. 105 Justice Scalia opined that the Court’s decision “needlessly
demean[ed] the rights of parenthood.” 106 Justice Scalia continued:
It has been the constant practice of the common law to
respect the entitlement of those who bring a child into
the world to raise that child. We do not inquire whether
leaving a child with his parents is “in the best interests
of the child.” It sometimes is not, he would be better
off raised by someone else. But parents have their
rights, no less than children do. This father wants to
raise his daughter and the statute amply protects his
right to do so. There is no reason in law or policy to
dilute that protection. 107

97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 652 (1975).
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2558.
Id. at 2570.
Id. at 2558.
Id.
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2559.
25 U.S.C.S. § 1901 (LexisNexis).
Id. at 2571-87. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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Evidently, Justice Scalia and Justice Stewart have vastly
different views. 108 The line of seminal Supreme Court cases,
commonly referred to as the Stanley-Michael H. line, concerning the
rights of unwed biological fathers tend to align closer to the sentiments
of Justice Stewart’s dissent in Caban as opposed to Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Baby Girl. 109 In these cases, there is a preconceived notion
that an unwed biological father is not a parent per se, but that he has
the opportunity to become one. 110 This preconceived notion stems
from the belief that, in many instances, an unwed biological father does
not intend to be a parent. 111 However, it is unfair to assume that an
unwed father cannot have the same or a similar relationship or
connection with his child as that of an unwed mother’s relationship
with her child merely because the unwed father did not physically give
birth to the child. 112 The following cases 113 are instances in which an
unwed father’s rights were deprived mostly for arbitrary reasons,
depending on the facts of each case.
A.

Stanley v. Illinois

Historically, an unwed father’s rights to the enjoyment of the
care and custody of his natural child were unclear. 114 Prior to 1972,115
the father of a child born out of wedlock was given few rights regarding
his child, if any. 116 However, for the first time in Stanley v. Illinois,
the Court held that unwed fathers have certain due process and equal
protection rights regarding child custody. 117
Joan Stanley and Peter Stanley, an unmarried couple, had three
children out of wedlock. 118 When Joan died, Mr. Stanley took full
108

See discussion infra Part III.
133 S. Ct. at 2571-87. (Scalia, J., dissenting); Caban, 441 U.S. at 397 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
110 See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262.
111 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 650, 665-66; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263.
112 See discussion supra Part I.
113 This Note will discuss Due Process claims, if any, as well as Equal Protection Claims.
The Due Process Claims, however, are beyond the scope of this Note.
114 See discussion supra Part I.
115 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646.
116 Karen C. Wehner, Daddy Wants Rights Too: A Perspective on Adoption Statutes, 31
HOUS. L REV. 691, 702 (1994).
117 Id.
118 Although they were not married, they were so close that they shared the same surname.
Id. at 646.
109
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custody of his children. 119 Under Illinois state law, 120 the state did not
need to show that Mr. Stanley was an unfit parent before taking away
his custody rights 121 because the law presumed that unwed fathers were
unfit parents while married fathers, married mothers, and unwed
mothers were fit. 122 The State of Illinois then removed the children
from Mr. Stanley’s custody, without a hearing to determine his
parental fitness, and declared the children to be wards of the state in
accordance with Illinois law and procedure. 123
Under this statutory scheme, Mr. Stanley, as an unwed father,
had no right to an individualized hearing to determine his parental
fitness. 124 Mr. Stanley argued that the statute violated the Due Process
Clause because he was automatically stripped of his right to a hearing
without an opportunity to show his fitness to parent his biological
children. 125 Additionally, he argued that the statutory scheme violated
the Equal Protection Clause because “he had never been shown to be
an unfit parent and that since married fathers and unwed mothers could
not be deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” 126 On the other hand, the State of Illinois
argued that, based on “history and culture,” unwed fathers were
“factually different” from married fathers because they were
historically physically absent from the home, lacked interest in their
children, and failed to accept responsibility for them. 127
The Court agreed with Mr. Stanley’s arguments, holding that
the statute violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause. 128 Specifically, the Court held that Mr. Stanley had
a due process right to present and defend his parental fitness in a court
of law. 129 Additionally, the Court held that the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause because denying unwed fathers the right to a
parental fitness hearing while granting this hearing to other Illinois
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Id.
ILL. REV. STAT., c. 37, § 705-8.
Id.
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 647.
Id. at 646.
Id.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 646.
Stanley, 405 U.S. at 653.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 657-58.
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parents was inescapably unequal. 130 It noted that while it may be true
that many unwed fathers, historically, did not have a presence in their
children’s lives, this was not the case for all unwed fathers both
historically and today. 131 Therefore, Mr. Stanley’s due process rights
and equal protection rights were violated. 132
Justice Burger wrote a dissent, accepting the state’s overly
general characterization of unwed fathers. 133 In his view, Illinois had
every right to protect “illegitimate” children by acknowledging a
difference between unwed mothers and unwed fathers. 134 He classified
unwed fathers as “not traditionally quite so easy to identify and
locate,” 135 basing this “theory” on “centuries of human experience.”136
Justice Burger opined that in the absence of marriage, adoption, or
some other legal undertaking, an unwed father might be denied the
same privileges that a married father enjoys. 137 In Justice Burger’s
view, Equal Protection is not violated when the state only gives
benefits to married fathers and not unmarried fathers because marriage
creates legal obligations not only to the marriage itself but also legal
obligations in adoption proceedings. 138
Overall, while the dissent implied that men were per se
reluctant fathers if they were not married or did not adopt their
children, the majority looked at the issue in a more objective light.139
The majority reasoned that Mr. Stanley, who had “sired and raised” his
children, despite not being married, must be held to the same standard
as any other parent would be. 140 The majority in Stanley rejected the
stigma of unwed fathers as uninterested and uninvolved in the lives of
their children. 141
130

Id. at 650.
Id. at 654-55,
132 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.
133 Id. at 659-68. (Burger, J., dissenting).
134 Id. at 665.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 666.
137 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 664. Additionally, Justice Burger argued that the Court should not
have looked at Due Process at all because Mr. Stanley did not raise it in the lower courts. Id.
at 662.
138 Justice Burger opined that Equal Protection was not violated “when the state gives full
recognition only to those father-child relationships that arise in the context of family units
bound together by legal obligations arising from marriage or from adoption proceedings.” Id.
139 See generally Id.
140 Id. at 650.
141 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649.
131
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The Stanley Court applied a variation of intermediate
scrutiny. 142 In the opinion, Justice White stated “[t]he private interest
here, that of a man in the children he sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.” 143 The burden placed on the State by the Stanley Court
was not only greater than a mere rational basis test of minimal scrutiny
but also less demanding than a heightened scrutiny standard, which
required a showing of necessity. 144 The Supreme Court, however, does
not always react this way when presented with an unwed father case. 145
Six years following the decision in Stanley, the Court took a step
backward in giving rights to unwed fathers.
B.

Quilloin v. Walcott

In Quilloin v. Walcott, 146 the father, Mr. Quilloin, never
actually married the mother of his child nor did he and the mother ever
share an established home as a family. 147 When Mr. Quilloin’s child
was less than three years old, the mother married another man, 148 and
this man moved to adopt the child years later. 149 Mr. Quilloin
“provided support only on an irregular basis,” but did visit his child on
“many occasions.” 150 Under a Georgia statute, 151 unwed fathers do not
have the right to veto an adoption unless they had already legitimized
their children. 152 Despite this, however, Mr. Quilloin attempted to
block the adoption via a petition for legitimation. 153
The trial court found that approving the stepfather’s adoption
and denying the biological father’s petition for legitimation were in the
best interests of the child. 154 As such, it rejected Mr. Quilloin’s petition

142 Linda R. Crane, Family Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REV. 427, 453,
n.171 (1993).
143 Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
144 Crane, supra note 142.
145 See generally Crane, supra note 142.
146 Quilloin, 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
147 Id. at 247.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 249.
150 Id. at 251.
151 See GA. CODE ANN. § 74–403(3) and § 74–203.
152 Id.
153 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248-49.
154 Id. at 250-51.
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to block the adoption for lack of standing. 155 Mr. Quilloin argued he
could not be shut out by the court in this way without a showing (a la
Stanley) that he was an unfit parent. 156 After the Supreme Court of
Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision, he appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court and was granted a writ of certiorari. 157 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that a Georgia statute denying an unwed father the
right to veto an adoption of his illegitimate child by another man did
not violate the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause. 158
The Court unanimously denied Mr. Quilloin’s petition for
legitimation under the “best interests of the child” standard and
affirmed the stepfather’s adoption of Mr. Quilloin’s biological son.159
The Court first opined that, although the Stanley Court found a
“father’s interest in the companionship, care, custody, and
management” of his children to be “cognizable and substantial,” 160 the
Stanley Court still “left unresolved” the rights of unwed fathers in cases
where “the countervailing interests are more substantial.” 161 The Court
pointed out that Mr. Quilloin provided support only on an irregular
basis, 162 and the mother believed that Mr. Quilloin’s visits and gifts
had a “disruptive effect on the child” and the family as a whole. 163
However, while the child wanted his stepfather to adopt him, she also
desired to keep in contact with Mr. Quilloin as her biological father. 164
The Court acknowledged that the “Due Process Clause would
be offended if a State were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural
family . . . without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason
that to do so was thought to be in the children’s best interest.”165
However, this case was different. 166 The Court listed three
distinctions.167 First, Mr. Quilloin never “had, or sought actual or legal

155

Id. at 251.
Id.
157 Id. at 253.
158 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
159 Id. at 253.
160 Id. at 248.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 251.
163 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 251.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–863
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
166 Id. at 255.
167 Id.
156
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custody of his daughter.” 168 Second, this was not a case “in which the
proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of parents with
whom the child had never before lived.” 169 Lastly, the adoption will
“give full recognition to a family unit already in existence, a result
desired by all concerned, except [Mr. Quilloin].” 170 With these
distinctions in mind, the Court determined that the stepfather’s
adoption of Mr. Quilloin’s biological child was in the child’s best
interests. 171
Mr. Quilloin’s Equal Protection Clause arguments as to the
unequal treatment of married fathers and unmarried fathers similarly
failed. 172 Mr. Quilloin argued that the state impermissibly treated his
case differently because “his interests [were] indistinguishable from
those of a married father who is separated or divorced from the mother
and is no longer living with his child.” 173 The Court rejected Mr.
Quilloin’s arguments and emphasized that Mr. Quilloin never sought
any responsibility, not even legal custody, before the stepfather’s
adoption proceeding. 174 The Court’s reasoning was ultimately based
on the fact that Mr. Quilloin was a reluctant father. 175 Thus, because
Mr. Quilloin “never shouldered any significant responsibility with
respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child,” it was in the best interests of the child to live in an already
existing family unit. 176
Overall, the Court refused to allow Mr. Quilloin to legitimize
his child because it found that such a process was not “in the best
interest of the child.” 177 The Due Process claim failed because Mr.
Quilloin did not have a previously established relationship with his
child and the child’s best interests superseded any unrealized interest
the father might have had. 178 With respect to the Equal Protection
claim, the Court found that, as opposed to Stanley where the father was
active in his child’s life, Mr. Quilloin had forfeited his constitutional
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256.
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254.
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255.
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protection of his parental status with his child by failing to accept any
significant parenting responsibility for his child. 179 The Quilloin Court
applied intermediate scrutiny, noting that the State needed only to
show that its actions were in the child’s best interest––this required
more than the minimal scrutiny standard of showing a rational basis
for the state action, but lacked the strict scrutiny requirement of
showing necessity. 180 Despite this brief step backward for unwed
fathers, the Court would reaffirm a different unwed father’s rights one
year later.
C.

Caban v. Mohammed

Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived in New York City
between 1968 and 1973. 181 They commonly presented themselves as
husband and wife, although they were never legally married because
of Mr. Caban’s marriage with another woman. 182 Despite this, Mr.
Caban successfully functioned as a father to his two biological children
with Maria. 183 He lived with his children and their mother as a
functioning family unit while providing them with necessary
support, 184 and his name even appeared on both of his children’s birth
certificates. 185 In December of 1973, Maria took the two children, and
left Mr. Caban, to live with Kazim Mohammed, whom she married
approximately one year later. 186 Following Maria’s remarriage, Mr.
Caban continued to see his two children at their maternal
grandmother’s house on a weekly basis. 187
The grandmother returned to her home in Puerto Rico in 1974,
and she took the children with her until Maria and Kazim Mohammed
( “Mohammeds”) could start a business together in New York City,
after which they would retrieve the children. 188 At the conclusion of a
trip to Puerto Rico in 1975, to visit his children, Mr. Caban took the

179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. 256.
Crane, supra note 142.
Caban, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979).
Mr. Caban and his actual wife were separated. Id.
Id. at 382.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Caban, 441 U.S. at 382.
Id.
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children with him back to New York City. 189 Maria was unable to
retain possession of her children through the police; she shortly,
thereafter, filed for custody proceedings in New York Family Court. 190
The Mohammeds were awarded temporary custody and Mr. Caban
was allowed visitation rights in the initial hearings. 191
At trial, Mr. Caban argued that biological fathers have a due
process right to maintain a parental relationship with their children
absent a finding of unfitness. 192 He also argued that the New York
statute 193 at issue violated the Equal Protection Clause due to
189

Id.
Id.
191 Id.
192 Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
193 The statute allowed for a mother to consent to an adoption “whether adult or infant, of a
child born out of wedlock” and a father to consent to an adoption:
[W]hether adult or infant, of a child born out-of-wedlock and placed with
the adoptive parents more than six months after birth, but only if such
father shall have maintained substantial and continuous or repeated
contact with the child as manifested by: (i) the payment by the father
toward the support of the child of a fair and reasonable sum, according to
the father’s means, and either (ii) the father’s visiting the child at least
monthly when physically and financially able to do so and not prevented
from doing so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody
of the child, or (iii) the father’s regular communication with the child or
with the person or agency having the care or custody of the child, when
physically and financially unable to visit the child or prevented from doing
so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the child.
The subjective intent of the father, whether expressed or otherwise,
unsupported by evidence of acts specified in this paragraph manifesting
such intent, shall not preclude a determination that the father failed to
maintain substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child. In
making such a determination, the court shall not require a showing of
diligent efforts by any person or agency to encourage the father to perform
the acts specified in this paragraph. A father, whether adult or infant, of a
child born out-of-wedlock, who openly lived with the child for a period of
six months within the one year period immediately preceding the
placement of the child for adoption and who during such period openly
held himself out to be the father of such child shall be deemed to have
maintained substantial and continuous contact with the child for the
purpose of this subdivision.
(e) Of the father, whether adult or infant, of a child born out-of-wedlock
who is under the age of six months at the time he is placed for adoption,
but only if: (i) such father openly lived with the child or the child’s mother
for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the
placement of the child for adoption; and (ii) such father openly held
himself out to be the father of such child during such period; and (iii) such
father paid a fair and reasonable sum, in accordance with his means, for
the medical, hospital and nursing expenses incurred in connection with the
190
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“overbroad generalizations” of gender-based classifications.194
Seeking adoption of the children, the Mohammeds, on the other hand,
argued that the gender-based distinctions were justified because there
is a fundamental difference between a child’s relationship with his
mother versus that of his father. 195 The Mohammeds explained that “a
natural mother, absent special circumstances, bears a closer
relationship with her child . . . than a father does,” and therefore, an
unwed biological father can never be as close to their child as an unwed
mother can. 196 The Surrogate’s Court granted Mr. Mohammed’s
petition for adoption, thereby cutting off all of Mr. Caban’s “parental
rights and obligations” to his children. 197
Both the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second
Department, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
Surrogate’s Court’s decision. 198 Mr. Caban then appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court and was granted a writ of certiorari. 199 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that a New York statute allowing a stepfather to
adopt his wife’s non-marital child without the consent of the child’s
biological father was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause due to
overbroad generalizations of gender-based classifications. 200
In a controversial five to four decision, U.S. Supreme Court
found that, while there was no Due Process Clause violation, 201 there
was an Equal Protection Clause violation based on gender
discrimination because unwed mothers and unwed fathers, who
maintain relationships with their children, are similarly situated, and
therefore, cannot be treated differently. 202 The Court held that the law
failed the intermediate scrutiny test because there was no showing
“that the different treatment afforded [to] unmarried fathers and
unmarried mothers b[ore] a substantial relationship” to the state’s
asserted interest in promoting the adoption of illegitimate children. 203
mother’s pregnancy or with the birth of the child.” N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 111 (McKinney 1977).
194 Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.
195 Id. at 387.
196 Id. at 388.
197 Id. at 383-84.
198 Id. at 384-85.
199 Caban, 441 U.S. at 385.
200 Id. at 394.
201 The Court dismissed his due process argument because Mr. Caban “was given due notice
and was permitted to participate as a party in the adoption proceedings” Id. at n. 3.
202 Caban, 441 U.S. at 392.
203 Id. at 393.
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The Court rejected the argument that unwed fathers could
never be as close to their children as unwed mothers because “even if
unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to their
newborn infants, this generalization concerning parent-child relations
would become less acceptable as a basis for legislative distinctions as
the age of the child increased.” 204 Several facts were important to the
Court’s decision: (i) the children were older, (ii) there was no difficulty
in identifying or locating the father, and (iii) the father had established
a “substantial relationship” with his children and even “admitted his
paternity.” 205 Thus, the New York statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it denied unwed fathers of their right to
block an adoption of their children, but granted this right to unwed
mothers. 206
Justice Stewart and Justice Stevens both dissented, asserting
that women and men were sufficiently different to warrant different
treatment under the laws of New York. 207 The Justices’ concerns
focused on the potential impact that adoption could have on very young
or newborn children. 208 Specifically, Justice Stevens pointed out that
“[o]nly the mother carries the child; it is she who has the constitutional
right to decide whether to bear it or not . . . “ 209 and only she “knows
who sired the child, and it will often be within her power to withhold
that fact, and even the fact of her pregnancy from that person.”210
Because the mother is obviously linked with the child throughout
pregnancy and birth, Justice Stevens reasoned that her identity to the
child is clear and obvious, whereas the identity of the natural father
may not be known for quite some time, if ever. 211 Because of these
differences, he argued that unmarried mothers have to make adoption
decisions on their own, whereas unmarried fathers may have to marry
the mothers in order to gain such rights. 212
Overall, Caban represented another case in which the Court
recognized the parental rights of unwed fathers who have established

204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

Id. at 389.
Id. at 392-93.
Id. at 393-94.
Caban, 441 U.S. at 394, 404.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 405.
Caban, 441 U.S. at 407-08.
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relationships with their children. 213 The Court struck down the New
York statute using an intermediate standard of scrutiny because it
treated similarly situated unwed mothers and fathers differently solely
based on gender classifications while serving no important
governmental interest. 214 Unfortunately, the rights of unwed fathers
would suffer a setback via the Court’s affirmance of a different New
York statute four years later.
D.

Lehr v. Robertson

In Lehr v. Robertson, 215 Lorraine Robertson was not married
when she gave birth to her daughter in November 1976. 216 The father
of the child, Jonathan Lehr, lived with Lorraine prior to the birth and
even visited her in the hospital, but his name did not appear on the
child’s birth certificate. 217 Post-birth, he did not live with Lorraine and
the child, did not provide them with financial support, and did not offer
to marry Lorraine. 218 Mr. Lehr had also not been judicially determined
to be the father, and he failed to enter his name into the state’s putative
father registry. 219 Within months of giving birth, Lorraine married
another man, Mr. Robertson, who then sought to adopt Lorraine’s
daughter in a proceeding in Ulster County. 220
One month after the adoption proceeding began in Ulster
County, and still unaware of it, Mr. Lehr filed a visitation and paternity
action in Westchester County Family Court asking for a
“determination of paternity, an order of support, and reasonable
visitation privileges with [his daughter].” 221 When the Ulster County
court was notified of this paternity proceeding in Westchester, it issued
a stay on that proceeding to determine whether that proceeding should
be transferred to Ulster County. 222 About two weeks later, Mr. Lehr
213

See generally Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
Id. at 394.
215 Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
216 Id. at 250.
217 Id. at 250.
218 Id. at 248. Mr. Lehr did claim that he eventually offered financial aid to the mother and
stepfather at some point. Id. at 269.
219 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 251. A “putative father registry” is “[a]n official roster in which an
unwed father may claim possible paternity of a child for purposes of receiving notice of a
prospective adoption of the child.” Ex parte D.B., 975 So.2d 940, 958 (Ala. 2007).
220 Id. at 250.
221 Id. at 252.
222 Id. at 252-53.
214
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received notice of the change of venue motion, and, for the first time,
learned that an adoption proceeding was pending in Ulster County.223
In the meantime, the Ulster County judge entered an adoption order
without notice to Mr. Lehr because he did not believe that such notice
was required. 224 As such, the proceeding in Westchester was not
transferred to Ulster County and the judge in Westchester dismissed
Mr. Lehr’s paternity action instead, holding that the putative father’s
right to seek paternity “must be deemed severed so long as an order of
adoption exists.”225
Mr. Lehr then filed a petition in Ulster County Family Court to
vacate the order because it was “obtained by fraud” and “violated his
constitutional rights.” 226 The Ulster County Family Court considered
the question of whether it “dropped the ball” by approving the adoption
without providing Mr. Lehr with proper notice. 227 After much
deliberation, the court denied the petition. 228 The Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court, Second Department, affirmed, holding that
“appellant’s commencement of a paternity action did not give him
any right to receive notice of the adoption proceeding, that the notice
provisions of the statute were constitutional,” and that Caban would
not apply here because the ruling from Caban, where a father’s consent
for adoption was required, “was not retroactive” 229 The court also
noted that Mr. Lehr “could have insured his right to notice by signing
the putative father registry.” 230
The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed, stating that the
Ulster County Family Court “had not abused its discretion either when
it entered the order without notice or when it denied appellant’s
petition to reopen the proceedings.” 231 It reasoned that, while it “might
have been prudent” to provide notice, the lower court did not abuse its
discretion because the primary purpose of the notice provision was “to
enable the person served to provide the court with evidence concerning
the best interest of the child, and that appellant had made no tender
223

Id. at 253.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253.
225 Id. at 253.
226 Id.
227 Id. at 253.
228 See generally, In the Matter of the Adoption by Lorraine and Richard Robertson of
Jessica Martz, 423 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979).
229 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 253-54.
230 Id. at 254, (quoting Adoption of Martz, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 774).
231 Id. at 255.
224
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indicating any ability to provide any particular or special information
relevant to [his daughter’s] best interest.” 232 The U.S. Supreme Court
then invoked appellate jurisdiction to hear the case, 233 and the opinion
was written by none other than Justice Stevens (the dissenter from
Caban). 234
Mr. Lehr argued that the aforementioned events, along with the
statute in question, deprived him of a liberty interest protected under
the Due Process Clause. 235 As such, he believed “he had a
constitutional right to prior notice and an opportunity to be heard
before he was deprived of that interest. 236“ Mr. Lehr also argued “that
the gender-based classification in the statute, which . . . denied him the
right to consent to [his daughter’s] adoption and accorded him fewer
procedural rights than her mother, violated the Equal Protection
Clause.” 237 Mr. Lehr, thus, sought to vacate the adoption. 238
As for Mr. Lehr’s due process argument, the Court first
carefully examined the nature of the liberty interest that was at stake—
the right of parents “to control the education of their children” and the
“right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their
children] for additional obligations.” 239 However, the Court noted that,
while parents generally may have this protected liberty interest, this
protection extended to unwed fathers only when they had assumed
responsibility for their children. 240
The Court, citing to Stanley, Quilloin, and Caban, reached the
following conclusion:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood by “com[ing]
forward to participate in the rearing of his child,” his
interest in personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the due process clause. At
that point it may be said that he “act[s] as a father
toward his children.” But the mere existence of a
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240

Id.
Id. at 254.
Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 535.
See generally Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection. The actions of judges neither create nor
sever genetic bonds. 241
The Court reasoned that a biological connection itself is not
enough to create a protected interest because it provides a natural father
only with an opportunity to maintain and develop a relationship with
his child. 242 Only if the unwed biological father seizes this opportunity
and take some responsibility for the well-being and future of the child
would he be able to have his parental rights protected by the
Constitution.243
Because Mr. Lehr did not take advantage of the opportunity
provided for him via the statute, 244 the Court did not recognize any sort
of protected special relationship. 245 The Court found the state’s
putative registry system 246 to be non-arbitrary because the “right to
receive notice was completely within [Mr. Lehr’s] control,” and he
ultimately chose not to enter his name there. 247 Additionally, the Court
used the “best interests of the child” standard in order to avoid breaking
up what was already a functioning family unit, as it did in Caban.248
Because it was Mr. Lehr’s fault for not entering his name in the state’s
putative father registry and for not seeking to establish a legal
connection to his child until after the child turned two years old, the
Court struck down his due process argument. 249 As such, the Court
held that the Due Process Clause does not require that notice be given
in all cases to a biological father on the pendency of an adoption
proceeding concerning the child. 250
The Court then dismissed Mr. Lehr’s Equal Protection Clause
argument, holding that Mr. Lehr was not similarly situated to the
241

Id. at 261. (citations omitted).
Id.
243 Id.
244 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111-a (2) (McKinney 1977). The statute provides that if
a father files with the states putative father registry, that act would demonstrate his intent to
claim paternity of his child born out of wedlock, and therefore he would be entitled to receive
notice of any proceeding to adopt his child. Id.
245 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264.
246 The system required Mr. Lehr to simply mail in a postcard if he wanted notice. This in
effect provides unwed fathers a simple means to show their interest in their children. Id. 24849, 263.
247 Id. at 264.
248 Id. at 262.
249 Id. at 262-63.
250 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 249.
242
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mother because he was a reluctant father who, unlike the mother, did
not try to take advantage of his opportunity to be a parent. 251 Thus, the
Court found that there was no gender discrimination at issue because
the mother and father were not similarly situated; deciding instead that
the distinction between married fathers and unmarried fathers was
reasonable. 252
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld New York’s law
providing for the termination of an unwed father’s rights if he failed to
place his name on the putative father registry. 253 It rejected the
plaintiff’s claims under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection
Clause 254 and expanded on the distinction between reluctant fathers
and fathers who actually take advantage of their parental obligations
and develop a nurturing relationship with their children. 255 This case
differs from the previous cases in that it draws a line, albeit one
susceptible to debate, between unwed biological fathers who may have
rights and those who may not. 256
The dissent in Lehr, penned by Justice White and joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun, took issue with the majority’s easy
dismissal of Mr. Lehr’s right to notice and the opportunity to be
heard. 257 In particular, the dissent asserted that Mr. Lehr did not have
an opportunity to present his case fully, 258 and fair judgment could not
be made “based on the quality or substance of a relationship without a
complete and developed factual record.” 259 The dissent also noted,
which the opinion did not discuss, that Mr. Lehr was not a reluctant
parent at all because he visited the mother every day in the hospital
after the birth of his child, 260 and he searched for the child in vain when
the mother hid from him after her release from the hospital. 261 In his
search, Mr. Lehr even hired a detective agency, only to learn that
Lorraine had already married a Mr. Robertson. 262 Additionally,
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262

Id. at 267-68.
Id. at 268 n.27.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 250.
Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261-62.
See generally Lehr, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
Id. at 268. (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 270-71.
See generally Lehr, 463 U.S. at 268-77. (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 269.
Id.
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according to Mr. Lehr, Lorraine refused his many offers of financial
assistance for the child and forced him to stay away from her and the
child. 263 It was at this point that Mr. Lehr decided to take legal
action. 264 The dissent suggested that the Robertson’s commenced the
stepfather adoption proceeding “perhaps as a response” to these
actions by Mr. Lehr. 265
The dissent gave the “biological relationship” more weight
than the majority. 266 Justice White rejected “the peculiar notion that
the only significance of the biological connection between father and
child is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male
possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring.” 267 Justice
White further stated that a “mere biological relationship is not as
unimportant in determining the nature of liberty interests as the
majority suggests.” 268 He opined that, where there was no doubt about
the identity or location of a putative father, it is difficult to accept such
careless treatment of procedural protections and insistence on “the
sheerest formalism to deny him a hearing because he informed the
State in the wrong manner. 269“ Thus, in addition to portraying how
simple it is to distort the facts and paint a different picture of Mr. Lehr’s
behavior, the dissent primarily focused on the majority’s diminishing
of procedural due process. 270
In deciding the due process issue, the Court applied only a
minimal level of scrutiny after it decided that the facts failed to show
Mr. Lehr had rights which were significant enough to require an
application of a higher level of scrutiny. 271 The Court did not apply a
standard of scrutiny to the equal protection claim because it determined
that Mr. Lehr was not similarly situated to the mother of his child.272
The Court noted that “[i]f one parent has an established custodial
relationship with the child and the other parent has either abandoned
or never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does
263

Id.
Id. 269. (White, J., dissenting).
265 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 269.
266 See generally id. at 268-77. (White, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 271.
268 Id.
269 Clearly, the dissent took issue with this “grudging and crabbed approach to due process.”
Id. at 274-75.
270 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 276.
271 Crane, supra note 142.
272 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267-68.
264
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not prevent a state from according the two parents different legal
rights.” 273
In sum, the Court in Lehr diminished the rights of unwed
fathers when it upheld the New York law providing for the termination
of an unwed father’s rights if he fails to place his name on the putative
father registry. 274 This case illustrates this Note’s argument that unwed
fathers, in a similar position as Mr. Lehr, should be able to reap the
benefits of a strict scrutiny analysis as opposed to the minimal level
applied in this case. 275 Although this case affirmed the rights of fathers
who did put their names on the putative father registry, such an act
would not be enough for that same unwed father to have his rights
affirmed in the following case.
E.

Michael H. v. Gerald D.

In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 276 a woman named Carole had an
extramarital affair with her neighbor, Michael, and became pregnant
with his child. 277 Carole still lived with her husband, Gerald, during
this time.278 Post-birth, Carole and the child briefly resided with
Michael, 279 but then Carole returned with the child to live with Gerald
and attempted to sever the relationship between Michael and the
child. 280 Blood tests confirmed there was a 98.07% chance that
Michael was the biological father of the child. 281 Carole claimed the
child was a product of her marriage to Gerald, and she withdrew her
stipulation to the results of Michael’s blood tests, which showed with
high probability that he was the child’s biological father. 282 Under
California law, 283 only a mother or her husband could deny paternity
of a child born into a marriage. 284 Absent Carole’s consent, Michael
lacked standing to establish paternity over his biological child or even

273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284

Id.
Id. at 264.
See discussion supra Part I.
Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 113-14.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 114.
Id. at 114-15.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 621.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 117.
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to seek visitation. 285 Although the child referred to Michael as her
“daddy,” 286 the child resided with Carole and Gerald. 287 Gerald held
the child out to be his own. 288 When the court prevented Michael from
establishing any legal relationship with his biological child, 289 it
automatically elevated Gerald’s status from stepfather to actual legal
father without going through an adoption proceeding. 290
Michael argued that his due process rights were violated
because the California law denied him his rights as a putative father to
legally establish a relationship with his biological child since the
mother of his child was married to a different man. 291 He did not argue
an Equal Protection violation. 292 The California trial court and the
California Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of the
California law. 293 While the California Supreme Court denied
discretionary review of the case, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted
“probable jurisdiction” to hear the case. 294 In a plurality opinion, the
Court held that a biological father does not have a fundamental right
to obtain legal parental rights over his child after the presumptive
father has already exercised significant responsibility over the child.295
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Michael argued both his
procedural due process rights 296 and substantive due process rights
were violated. 297 Specifically, he argued his procedural due process
rights were violated because he was not afforded the “opportunity to
demonstrate his paternity in an evidentiary hearing” before the state
terminated his liberty interest with his child. 298 However, the Court
upheld the California law, reasoning that although the law was facially
procedural, it was, in reality, a substantive rule because it helped to
further the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of the family

285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298

Id. at 126.
Id. at 144. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 110.
Id. at 110.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 116.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 124.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 119.
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unit. 299 Thus, Michael’s procedural due process claim failed because
the statute was not in fact procedural in purpose. 300
The Court also denied Michael’s substantive due process claim
because Michael did not have a protected liberty interest as an unwed
biological father of a child born into a pre-existing marital
relationship. 301 Specifically, it reasoned that, where “the child is born
into an extant marital family, the natural father’s unique opportunity
conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the
marriage; and it is not unconstitutional for the State to give categorical
preference to the latter.” 302
The Court noted that in order for Michael to be successful, it
was his burden to prove society traditionally allows a father to assert
parental rights over his child born into an existing marital family; the
Court could not find anything “in the older sources, nor in the older
cases.” 303 Michael argued his case was similar to those of Stanley,
Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr in that these established a liberty interest
created by biological fatherhood plus an established parental
relationship––factors that he argued existed in his case. 304 The Court,
however, thought Michael’s interpretations “distorts the rationale of
those cases.” 305 The Court felt those cases “rest not upon such isolated
factors but upon the historic respect—indeed, sanctity would not be
too strong a term—traditionally accorded to the relationships that
develop within the unitary family.” 306 Therefore, since the Court could
not find any relevant sources to back up Michael’s claim, it ruled that
Michael did not have a substantive due process right. 307
For the above reasons, it did not matter that Michael had
established a parental relationship with his biological child during the
first three years of her life by living with her, visiting her when
possible, caring for her, and holding her out as his own. 308 Although
Michael had demonstrated “a full commitment to the responsibilities
of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119.
Id.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 125.
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.
Id. at 123.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 143-44. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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child,’” he did not have a liberty interest because his child was born
into an existing family unit, and it was in the child’s best interests to
preserve the integrity of that family unit. 309 In other words, the Court
held that the only way a legal relationship between Michael and his
biological child could be recognized would be if there were not already
a functioning legal family unit. 310 Interestingly, the Court did not
apply any standard of constitutional scrutiny in this case; instead, the
Court “embellish[ed] elaborately” on the importance of protecting the
“traditional presumptions of paternity.” 311
In a lengthy and fiery dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the
Court’s reliance on a basic definition of “tradition” was
“misguided.” 312 Justice Brennan wrote:
[T]he plurality ignores the kind of society in which our
Constitution exists. We are not an assimilative,
homogeneous society, but a facilitative, pluralistic one,
in which we must be willing to abide someone else’s
unfamiliar or even repellent practice because the same
tolerant
impulse
protects
our
own
idiosyncra[s]ies. Even if we can agree, therefore, that
“family” and “parenthood” are part of the good life, it
is absurd to assume that we can agree on the content of
those terms and destructive to pretend that we do. In a
community such as ours, “liberty” must include the
freedom not to conform. The plurality today squashes
this freedom by requiring specific approval from
history before protecting anything in the name of
liberty. 313
It is evident Justice Brennan did not play into what appears as
gender stereotyping that Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion does; Justice
Brennan made it clear that unwed fathers are entitled to fundamental

309

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 143 (citations omitted).
Id. at 126-27.
311 Crane, supra note 142.
312 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140.
313 Justice Brennan admonished the plurality for its decision to deny Michael his liberty
interest in being a father. Basing its decision on the fact that a similar situation has not
happened before, the plurality, in Justice Brennan’s view, turns the Constitution into a
“stagnant, archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time
long past.” Id. at 141.
310
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rights despite the circumstances. 314 He referred to the plurality’s
exclusive reliance on “tradition” as both “misguided” and “novel”315
and felt that the plurality’s approach was “troubling” because of how
“unnecessary” it was. 316 With mention of Stanley, Quilloin, Caban,
and Lehr, Justice Brennan rejected the notion that concern for the
“unitary family” can alter the meaning of this line of cases. 317
Michael H. v. Gerald D. was clearly different from the previous
four cases in that it based its decision on the sacredness and historical
influence of the unitary family. 318 Combined, this line of cases
represents the Courts present take on the rights, or lack thereof, of
unwed biological fathers. 319
IV.

ANALYSIS

The rights of unwed biological fathers is a topic that has been
and likely to continue to be debated by Courts and scholars alike. 320 It
is evident that the general consensus on this topic changes based on
which generation of Supreme Court Justices are sitting on the Court at
the time a relevant case is presented to them. 321 To see where the Court
may be headed in the near future regarding this issue, an analysis of
where it has been in the not so distant past is required. 322
A.

The Stanley-Michael H. Line

Commonly referred to as the “Stanley-Lehr line,” 323 Stanley,
Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr each examined the constitutional rights of
unwed fathers. 324 While each case mainly focused on resolving factual
issues rather than developing a systematic theoretical scheme, each
case builds on its predecessor; thus, this line of cases presents an
314

Id. Even if the child in question is already a part of a functioning familial atmosphere.

Id.
315

Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.
317 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 143-47.
318 Id. at 123.
319 See discussion infra Part IV.
320 See discussion supra Part I.
321 See discussion supra Part I.
322 See discussion infra Part IV.
323 See Mark Strassser, The Often Illusory Protections of “Biology Plus:” On the Supreme
Court’s Parental Rights Jurisprudence, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 31 (2007).
324 See cases cited supra note 1.
316
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“integrated articulation of the parental rights of unwed fathers.” 325 The
cases stand for the notion that a father who participates in his child’s
life enjoys the fundamental constitutional right to have a relationship
with his child despite not being married to the child’s mother.326
Caban v. Mohammed, in particular, strongly supported this notion by
upholding the rights of Mr. Caban, an unwed father. 327 Lehr v.
Robertson and Quilloin, despite denying the rights of the unwed father
because he did not contribute or partake in his respective children’s
lives, still acknowledged that substantial rights of an unwed father do
in fact exist if the father chooses to participate in his children’s lives.328
Since the fathers in the Stanley-Lehr line of cases “did not meet any
other criteria for establishing parenthood,” it can be said that the
Court’s interpretation of the word “father” in these cases meant a
“natural or biological father.” 329
Michael H. v. Gerald D., the most recent of the unwed father
cases, changed the game and is an example of the Court’s confusion
when it comes to unwed father cases because it had no majority
opinion 330 and the positions of each of the Justices was relatively
unclear. 331 Thus, to develop a constitutional rule that can be broadly
applied to a future unwed father case may be “almost impossible.”332
Despite a plurality opinion, Michael H. rejected the general rule from
the Stanley-Lehr line of cases––that an unwed father can maintain his
parental rights if he chooses to participate in his children’s lives;
meaning, five Justices still, in fact, accepted the validity of this rule in
Michael H. 333
While this Note agrees with the general rule of the Stanley-Lehr
line of cases, this Note more specifically aligns itself with the
outcomes of Stanley and Caban, where the individual father’s rights

325

Anthony Miller, The Case for the Genetic Parent: Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, Lehr, and
Michael H. Revisited, 53 LOY. L. REV. 395, 415-16 (2007).
326 See Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261; Caban, 441 U.S. at 392; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; Stanley,
405 U.S. 645, 657-58.
327 Caban, 441 U.S. at 391-94.
328 See Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255; Lehr, 463 U.S. at 260-61.
329 Miller, supra note 325, at 416.
330 It was a plurality opinion.
331 Miller, supra note 325, at 416-17.
332 Id. at 417.
333 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Here, Justice Brennan described
the common ground that most of the Justices did share despite not agreeing on the overall
outcome of the case. Id.
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were affirmed, and against Lehr, Quilloin, and Michael H., where the
individual father’s rights were denied. 334
In Stanley and Caban, the Court specifically upheld the rights
of the unwed fathers because those fathers previously had custody of
their respective child. 335 While the Court in Michael H. later stated
that even if a father once had custody, that still may not be a sufficient
condition to protect the unwed father’s rights. 336 The fathers in Stanley
and Caban had established parental bonds with their respective
children, while the fathers in Lehr and Quilloin did not have such a
relationship––this may be why the Court chose to uphold the
individual father’s rights in the former cases and not the latter. 337
In the Lehr and Quilloin cases, although the Court refused to
enforce the rights of the unwed fathers because they did not participate
in their children’s lives, the Court acknowledged potential substantial
rights for an unwed participatory father under a different set of facts
not before the Court. 338 Thus, a concise rule from these four cases (and
further explored in Lehr) may be stated as: “the genetic father who has
participated in his child’s life has a constitutional right to have a
relationship with his child.” 339
As previously referred to, Michael H. was an anomaly that
wanted no part of this “rule” from the Stanley- Lehr line of cases.340
One scholar noted that “it is uncertain whether Michael H. rejected this
principle or overruled these cases.” 341 Michael H. v. Gerald D. was a
plurality opinion, so therefore, it is important to note that “[f]our
Members of the Court agree that Michael H. has a liberty interest in

334

See discussion supra Part III.
See generally Stanley, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Caban, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
336 See generally Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
337 June Carbone, The Legal Definition of Parenthood, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295 at note 142
(2005). As the Court explained in Lehr, the difference between the “developed parent-child
relationship that was implicated in Stanley and Caban, and the potential relationship involved
in Quilloin and [ Lehr]” is that in the former cases the unwed fathers came forward to
participate in the rearing of their children. Lawrence Schlam, Third Part Disputes in
Minnesota: Overcoming the “Natural Rights” of Parents Pursuing the “Best Interests” of
Children?, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 733, 744, n.57 (2000).
338 See, e.g., Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255. The justices distinguished “a case in which the
unwed father had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 26061. The Court stated that an unwed father acquires substantial protection when he participates
in the rearing of his child. Id.
339 Miller, supra note 325, at 416.
340 See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110.
341 Miller, supra note 325, at 453.
335

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

35

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 [2018], Art. 16

684

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

his relationship with [his biological child].” 342 Justice Scalia’s
opinion, being harsh towards the biological father, has indeed become
the most renowned, but its “effect and meaning . . . are ambiguous to
say the least.” 343 Luckily, since Michael H. was a plurality opinion, its
decision binds only the parties and it has no precedential effect. 344
Thus, this ongoing debate of constitutional protections of unwed
fathers clearly remains unresolved. 345
The holdings of Stanley and Caban should be expanded to
include non-participatory fathers, and Lehr and Quilloin should have
enforced the non-participatory father’s rights by arguing that being a
biological father alone, absent exceedingly persuasive facts that paint
the father in a negative light, should entitle an unwed biological father
to at least some constitutional right to affect the “care, custody, and
management” 346 of his child. 347 Involvement in a child’s life should
absolutely be encouraged and rewarded, but not being involved should
not dispel an unwed father of all his constitutional rights as it pertains
to his biological children, as it did in Michael H. 348
Clearly, the issue of who should qualify as a parent, be it unwed
fathers or even unwed mothers, is currently in a state of flux.349
Anthony Miller, a Professor at Pepperdine University School of Law
writing for Loyola Law Review, argued that a logical conclusion from
Michael H. is that each state is free to extend or deny constitutional
rights of parents “almost at will.” 350 He argued this because the only
expressed definition of “parent” (genetic parents who have participated
in their child’s) from the Stanley-Lehr line of cases was ignored by
Michael H.’s plurality. 351 Since Michael H., the Supreme Court has
yet to definitively rule on what a constitutional “parent” entails and
whether an unwed biological father may fit into that hypothetical
definition. 352

342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 136. (J. Brennan, dissenting).
Miller, supra note 325, at 454-55.
Id. at 455.
See discussion supra Part IV.
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 253.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110.
See generally Miller, supra note 325.
Id. at 449.
Id.
Id.
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SOLUTION: RAISING THE STANDARD TO A HIGHER LEVEL OF
SCRUTINY

When examining a case dealing with the rights of an unwed
father, the Court has historically applied an intermediate level of
scrutiny to analyze the basis of the father’s claim. 353 This is because
the Court was analyzing the treatment of a specific statute as applied
to unwed fathers as opposed to unwed mothers––a blatant gender
discrimination and, by definition, subject to intermediate scrutiny. 354
However, the focus of analysis should not be on the mistreatment
between genders, rather the Court’s focus should be based on the
deprivation of a fundamental right, the right to parent; thus, subjecting
the Court to apply strict scrutiny instead of intermediate scrutiny.
The Supreme Court has held that the rights of individual
parents are fundamental rights and are, thus, subject to strict
scrutiny. 355 Logically, this would mean that cases concerning the
rights of unwed biological fathers are (or at least should be) subject to
strict scrutiny. 356 This, of course, assumes that the phrase “unwed
biological father” fits into the Courts perspective of what a parent is. 357
Acknowledging the importance of this relationship, the Court has held
the parent-child relationship to be such an important and sacred
relationship that it should be afforded the utmost protection. 358 The
application of strict scrutiny would afford unwed fathers, as parents,
the right to make decisions regarding the care of their children, giving
them the fundamental constitutional protection they deserve. 359
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has yet to conclusively rule on what the
definition of a constitutional parent entails and whether an unwed

353

Caban, 491 U.S. at 391.
Karen J. McMullen, The Scarlet “N:” Grandparent Visitation Statutes That Base
Standing on Non-Intact Family Status Violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 693, 699 (2009).
355 See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
356 See supra notes 357-59.
357 See discussion infra Part VI.
358 See Santosky, 455 U.S. 755, 753 (1982) (discussing “the fundamental liberty interest of
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child”).
359 See generally id.
354
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biological father may fit into that hypothetical definition. 360 If and
when this unique opportunity comes along, the Court should seize this
moment by defining, constitutionally, the term parent and
incorporating unwed fathers into that definition. 361
The definition of parent, including unwed fathers, should be
“restored back to its pre-Michael H.” role. 362 The Court in Michael H.
denied rights to a biological father because he was not married to the
mother at the time the child was born (despite being a part of the child’s
life). 363 This directly conflicts with the standard set forth from the
Stanley-Lehr line of cases. 364
Additionally, the general rule stemming from the Stanley-Lehr
line of cases, that substantial rights for an unwed father do in fact exist
if the father chooses to participate in his children’s lives, should be
expanded. 365 As one author eloquently put it, a biological father should
fit into this newfound definition of parent even if he did not receive an
opportunity to develop a relationship with his biological child when:
he has been “prevented through no fault of his or her own from
establishing a relationship,” and when he partakes in utilizing “cutting
edge reproductive technology and the state has moved to sever the
parent-child relationship before the opportunity to develop such a
relationship has arisen.” 366 If the government had the power to
determine the definition of parent for constitutional purposes, as it did
in Michael H., then it must also have the power to determine who can
assert the fundamental constitutional rights that parents receive and the
protections that go with it. 367
The constitutional right to parent should be associated with the
individual as opposed to the individual’s marital status because the
definition of a “normal” marriage or family is constantly evolving.368
This Note argues that questions concerning the constitutional rights of
not only unwed biological fathers but also parents in general, as it
pertains to their children, should be subject to a strict scrutiny analysis.

360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368

See discussion supra Part V.
See Miller, supra note 325, at 349.
See Miller, supra note 325, at 450.
See Michael H., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part III.
See discussion supra Part I.
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In some unwed father cases, the U.S. Supreme Court stands up
for and recognizes the rights of unwed biological fathers 369 and, in
other cases, denies basic liberty interests of unwed fathers 370 possibly
based on the Justices’ personal biases interfering with their judicial
discretion. 371 This Note agrees with the general rule from the StanleyLehr line that substantial rights for an unwed father do in fact exist if
the father chooses to participate in his children’s lives (and the
holdings themselves in Stanley and Caban). 372 Furthermore, this Note
also believes that this rule should be expanded absent facts that paint
the unwed father in a negative light; therefore, disagreeing with the
specific holdings of Lehr and Quilloin. 373 The Stanley and Caban
Courts enforced the respective unwed father’s rights in part because
the unwed fathers had established parental relationships with their
children. 374 The Court failed to enforce such rights in Quilloin or Lehr
because of a lack of such relationship, though the Court did allude that
different facts may have a different outcome. 375
This Note critically disagrees with the holding in Michael H. in
which the Court held that a biological father does not have a
fundamental right to obtain legal parental rights over his child after the
presumptive father has already exercised significant responsibility
over the child. 376 If and when presented with the opportunity to define
parent in a constitutional aspect, the Court must include unwed fathers
and grant them constitutional rights to affect the “care, custody, and
management” 377 of their children even if only a limited variation
thereof and even if the unwed father has historically been nonparticipatory in his child’s life. 378
Gender stereotyping has been and unfortunately likely will
continue to be a part of American society. 379 When the Court denies
an unwed father his parental rights with his biological child, the Court
369
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does this based on what it believes a “normal” marriage or family to
be. 380 The Supreme Court has held that a biological parent’s
relationship with his or her child is a fundamental right that is tied to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and such a connection should
only be severed by the state under limited circumstances. 381 Therefore,
this Note argues that attempts by the government to impinge these
rights should be subject to a strict scrutiny type level of review rather
than the current standard of intermediate scrutiny under Equal
Protection. 382
Additionally, the Court should focus on the individual father’s
rights having been violated rather than overemphasizing that
individual’s marital status. 383 Unwed fathers may not fit into the literal
definition of what constitutes a parent, as established in Michael H.,
but there should be a place in a court-mandated expanded definition of
the term parent to include all biological parents having protected,
fundamental constitutional rights. 384 Society should no longer allow
Supreme Court Justices to legislate their interpretation of morality.385
Unwed biological fathers should be protected by the fundamental right
to parent, absent any negative facts to the contrary. 386 This freedom
should be protected by the highest level of scrutiny, protected even
from any judicial biases. 387
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